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Abstract  
From the late-1990s onwards, anti-social behaviour has been high on the political agenda in 
Britain. This chapter draws on philosophical, criminological and other writings to unpick 
some influences of aesthetic taste on what is perceived to be anti-social. The meaning and 
subjectivity of aesthetic judgment are considered, with examples given that may lead to 
censure and ‘banishment’ – such as wearing a hoodie, writing the wrong sort of graffiti or 
being visibly homeless. Due to its influence on British policy, Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) 
‘broken windows’ is given particular attention and, in line with Ferrell (2006), is seen as an 
aesthetic theory that makes various assumptions as to what – or who – act as signals of 
urban decay. The chapter considers whether it is ever right to censure aesthetic taste and 
simply banish the unsightly. Instead, it is suggested that respect for difference could 
alternatively be promoted. 
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Introduction 
From the late-1990s onwards, anti-social behaviour has been high on the political agenda in 
Britain. Of course, at the end of the twentieth century, anti-social behaviour was nothing 
new, a fact highlighted in other contributions to this volume. Yet, following pressure on MPs 
from constituents facing difficulties with people labelled as ‘neighbours from hell’ (Straw, 
1996; Field, 2003) – and influenced by American zero-tolerance policing strategies (Millie, 
2009a) – the 1997-2010 New Labour government made anti-social behaviour one of its key 
policy targets. Being anti-social was defined by New Labour as behaving ‘in a manner that 
caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of 
the same household as [the perpetrator]’ (Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, s.1(1a)). As has 
been well documented (Ashworth et al., 1998; Ramsay, 2004; Millie, 2009a), there were 
issues with such a vague definition. In the first instance, what causes me harassment, alarm 
or distress may be quite different for someone else. Deciding what or who ‘was likely’ to be 
anti-social was even more subjective and problematic.  
This chapter considers such subjective interpretations. Specifically, the focus is on 
aesthetic determinants of perceived anti-social behaviour – whilst acknowledging that there 
are clearly other influences on perception (see e.g. Jacobson, Millie and Hough, 2008; 
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Mackenzie et al., 2010). The discussion draws on philosophical, criminological and other 
writings to unpick some influences of aesthetic taste on what is perceived to be anti-social. 
For instance, the chapter considers aesthetic interpretations of dress (such as the hoodie) 
that may lead police officers to see someone as potentially anti-social. Furthermore, 
proponents of a particular style of graffiti may be censured, yet others may fit an agreeable 
aesthetic and be celebrated. As for talk of ‘neighbours from hell,’ problems may stem from 
serious behavioural issues, but may also concern conflicting tastes. However, is it right to 
censure taste, something that is both subjective and emotive? This chapter considers the 
impact of aesthetic taste on others and how differences in lifestyle can lead to some being 
labelled as anti-social.  
Like New Labour before it, the 2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government identified anti-social behaviour as an important policy issue (Millie, 2013). 
According to the Conservative Home Secretary Theresa May (2012: 3), ‘No one should have 
to accept graffiti on their walls, public drunkenness on their streets or harassment and 
intimidation on their own doorstep.’ At first, it is hard to argue with such logic, that 
everyone wants somewhere ‘nice’ to live. Yet each part of this statement is subjective. 
Harassment and intimidation are perhaps less problematic, as very few people would want 
to put up with these types of behaviours – although tolerances may vary. Public 
drunkenness is again something that at first seems uncontroversial. Yet there is an aesthetic 
to public drunkenness which means some drunks are more acceptable than others. For 
example, city workers drinking outside a pub at 5pm on a Friday are usually an accepted 
part of city life; yet a street homeless person drinking at lunchtime may be less acceptable. 
As for May’s statement that ‘No one should have to accept graffiti on their walls,’ this 
becomes problematic when certain forms of graffiti and street art can act as attractors for 
tourists and part of what makes an urban district ‘edgy’ – and therefore an attractive place 
to live. Here graffiti contributes to processes of gentrification rather than decline as often 
assumed (Young, 2014).  
In this chapter, the meaning and subjectivity of aesthetic judgment are considered. 
The relevance of aesthetics to assessments of anti-social behaviour is then explored and 
examples are given of aesthetic judgments leading to censure and ‘banishment.’ James 
Wilson and George Kelling’s (1982) ‘broken windows’ perspective has been especially 
influential to British anti-social behaviour policy. Because of this influence, broken windows 
is given particular attention. In line with Jeff Ferrell (2006), this is seen as an aesthetic 
theory that makes various assumptions as to what – or who – act as signals of urban decay. 
The chapter finishes by discussing whether it is ever right to censure aesthetic taste, before 
concluding that it can be a mistake to enforce subjective taste and simply banish the 
unsightly. Instead, it is suggested that respect for difference could alternatively be 
promoted. However, first it is worth unpacking what is meant by aesthetic judgment. 
 
Aesthetic judgment 
Aesthetics has for many years been a concern of philosophy and art criticism focusing 
mainly on questions pertaining to what makes art good and whether there is such a thing as 
objective beauty. William Gilpin (1786), for example, considered criteria that made a 
landscape beautiful or sublime. Writing around the same time Immanuel Kant concluded 
that beauty is subjective, that ‘an objective principle of taste is impossible’ (1790/2011: 12). 
In effect, according to Kant, there can be no objectively beautiful or sublime landscape (or 
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objectively beautiful or sublime anything else), only our interpretations depending on taste. 
Thus, building on a Kantian perspective, I take the view that aesthetics is concerned with 
taste, with subjective and emotive values attached to sensory encounters (Millie, 2008; 
2011). For an example, Kant considered the beauty of a flower: 
 
To say, This flower is beautiful, is tantamount to a mere repetition of the flower’s own claim to 
everyone’s liking. The agreeableness of its smell, on the one hand, gives it no claim whatsoever: its 
smell delights one person, it makes another dizzy […] beauty is not a property of the flower itself. For 
a judgment of taste consists precisely in this, that it calls a thing beautiful only by virtue of the 
characteristics in which it adapts itself to the way we apprehend it (Kant, 1790/2011: 10). 
 
This subjectivity of aesthetic taste has direct relevance to the acceptability – or otherwise – 
of certain anti-social behaviours. Following Kant, there can be no agreed list of graffiti or 
street art styles that are always aesthetically acceptable. Groups of young people wearing 
hoodies may be turned away from one location because they do not adhere to a particular 
aesthetic being promoted, yet accepted elsewhere. A visibly homeless person may be 
moved on from a high end retail district, but ignored in another.  
For some, aesthetic preferences are restricted to visual and aural stimuli. For Kant’s 
flower, there was also the influence of smell. You can add to this all other senses and 
beyond. This chapter is concerned with what Yuriko Saito (2007) refers to as everyday 
aesthetics. Influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s (1961/2008) ‘everyday life,’ everyday aesthetics 
relates to everyday objects, events and encounters. For instance, reading a message left by 
a graffiti writer is an everyday aesthetic experience, and so too is feeling the texture of a 
‘guerrilla knitter’s’ crocheted wool that has been left without permission enveloping a tree 
(see Deadly Knitshade, 2011). Encountering the graffiti and guerrilla knitting may be 
negative aesthetic experiences – and perceived as anti-social by some – yet for others they 
may add something positive to the urban experience that make the city somewhere that is 
more pleasurable to be.  
Inherent to aesthetic judgments are ideas of taste, and relatedly notions of good taste 
and bad taste. In relation to graffiti, Germaine Greer once commented, ‘Instead of spending 
a fortune getting rid of it, why don’t we just give it marks out of 10?’ (Greer, 2007; Millie, 
2008). Presumably, those doing the scoring will have ‘good taste’? Greer may have been 
deliberately provocative with such a statement, yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, the 
statement gets to the heart of the problem of mixing aesthetic judgment with assessments 
of what is acceptable or anti-social. A graffiti writer that scores low on Greer’s scale will no 
doubt face prosecution, whereas a high scorer – Banksy perhaps? – will be celebrated. In 
relation to questions of taste and neighbourliness, according to the conservative 
philosopher Roger Scruton (2009: 133-4): 
 
In a democratic culture people are inclined to believe that it is presumptuous to claim to have better 
taste than your neighbour. By doing so you are implicitly denying his right to be the thing that he is. 
You like Bach, she likes U2 […] she likes Jane Austen, you like Danielle Steel. Each of you exists in his 
own enclosed aesthetic world, and so long as neither harms the other, and each says good morning 
over the fence, there is nothing further to be said. […] [But] your neighbour fills her garden with kitsch 
mermaids and Disneyland gnomes, polluting the view from your window. […] Now her taste has 
ceased to be a private matter and inflicted itself on the public realm. 
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It is when someone’s private taste becomes public that it may be interpreted as anti-social – 
be that someone’s taste in graffiti or gnomes and mermaids. In the above example, having a 
garden full of gnomes and mermaids may be perceived as anti-social, in the same way that 
growing a high hedge could be anti-social, because it is inconsiderate of neighbours. 
According to the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (s.66), a high hedge is defined as causing: 
 
so much of a barrier to light or access as (a) is formed wholly or predominantly by a line of two or 
more evergreens; and (b) rises to a height of more than two metres above ground level.  
 
A private taste – a liking for tall hedges and privacy – has become public by restricting the 
amount of sunlight reaching a neighbour or making access to a neighbour’s property more 
difficult. Much criminological and legal theory emphasize harm and offence as determinates 
of criminalization (Feinberg, 1984; 1985; Hillyard et al., 2004; von Hirsch and Simester, 
2006). With the example of ‘high hedges,’ it is the practical harm to quality of life that is 
important; but also the aesthetic offence and maybe moral offence that a neighbour would 
inflict their taste on you, a taste for high hedges that you do not share. This is similarly the 
case for the garden gnomes and mermaids; however there may also be economic impacts 
by lowering the attractiveness of the street and thereby deflating property prices.  
According to Carolyn Korsmeyer (2005: 275), ‘Those who conceive of themselves as 
having good taste may condescend to those with “inferior” tastes, while the later may 
consider the former mere snobs […].’ It is questionable why one person’s taste should take 
precedence over another’s – even if the other’s taste is for gnomes and mermaids. This was 
a point picked up by Pierre Bourdieu (1979/2010) in charting an aristocracy of culture from 
popular taste, through middle-brow to the ‘legitimate’ tastes of the ruling classes. There are 
clearly issues of power in who defines what is acceptable, or what Ferrell (1996) has termed 
an aesthetics of authority. Those deemed to have poor aesthetic taste tend to be the 
powerless. When censured as anti-social the consequences of such assessments become 
more serious. 
 
 
Aesthetics and banishing the anti-social 
The mixing of aesthetic judgment and censure has historic precedent, especially in relation 
to the fashion of offenders (and those thought likely to offend). In the eighteenth century, 
the Black Act 1723 meant having your face blackened or being otherwise disguised was a 
capital offence (Treadwell, 2008). Determining what constitutes a disguise may not have 
been straightforward. In Victorian Britain, dressing in a fashion similar to a ‘Hooligan’, 
‘Peaky Blinder’ or ‘Scuttler’ could have landed you in all sorts of trouble (Pearson, 2009). 
Similar stereotypes persist today making some young people more likely to attract the 
attention of the police than others, as those likely to be anti-social and in need of dispersal. 
The hoodie, along with a baseball cap, ‘designer’ sports attire and trainers is the uniform of 
the ‘chav’1 (Hayward and Yar, 2006) or ‘ned’2 (Brown, 2008) – the young working class that, 
to use Korsmeyer’s words (2005: 275), are condescended as having ‘inferior tastes.’ 
Famously, the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent was the first to ban the wearing of 
hoodies (Hayward and Yar, 2006; Millie, 2009a), ostensively so that all could be seen by 
their CCTV systems; but also to ally the prejudicial concerns of other customers that hoodie 
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wearing youths were anti-social – despite hoodies being on sale within the shopping centre. 
According to Hayward and Yar:  
 
[...] street-level attempts to mobilize cultural capital based on overt displays of designer clothing have 
instead inspired a whole new raft of bizarre micro social control mechanisms, including everything 
from town centre pubs and night clubs refusing entry to individuals wearing certain brands within 
their premises [...] to the recent ‘zero tolerance’ policy imposed on ‘designer hoodies’ and baseball 
caps [...] by major shopping centres [...]. Thus the situation arises in which many of the labels and 
monograms valorized by young people as badges of identity serve also to function as overt signifiers 
of deviance. As such they become tools of classification and identification by which agencies of social 
control construct profiles of potential criminal protagonists (2006: 22-3).  
 
Not only are the young stereotypically regarded as ‘problem’ populations, but so too the 
poor. To be young and poor amplifies the potential threat. Aesthetics is relevant to both 
groups as aesthetic cues – including dress codes – can influence initial assessments of what 
type of person someone is (although, of course, such assessments are not always accurate). 
Charles Baudelaire’s poem ‘The eyes of the poor’ encapsulates the ruling class’s aesthetic 
assessment of the poor. In the poem, two lovers enjoy a new café in George Haussmann’s 
redesigned nineteenth century Paris. As retold by Marshall Berman (1982: 149): 
 
As the lovers sit gazing happily into each other’s eyes, suddenly they are confronted with other 
people’s eyes. A poor family dressed in rags – a graybearded father, a young son, and a baby – come 
to stop directly in front of them and gaze raptly at the bright new world that is just inside […]. He is 
‘touched by this family of eyes’ […]. ‘I turned my eyes to look into yours dear love, to read my 
thoughts there’ […] she says, ‘These people with their great saucer eyes are unbearable! Can’t you tell 
the manager to get them away from here?’ (Berman, 1982: 149).  
 
The visible presence of the poor does not meet the lover’s aesthetic expectations. The sight 
of ‘a poor family dressed in rags’ jars with the romance of the situation. What the lover calls 
for is what, in a North American context, Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert (2010) have 
called banishment. In Seattle, for example:  
 
Increasing swathes of urban space are delimitated as zones of exclusion from which the undesirable 
are banned. The uniformed police are marshaled to enforce and often delineate these boundaries; 
they use their powers to monitor and arrest in an attempt to clear the streets of those considered 
unsightly or ‘disorderly’ (Beckett and Herbert, 2010: 8).  
 
Key here is the idea of banishing the ‘unsightly.’ As Beckett and Herbert emphasize, the 
situation is not unique to Seattle. It is also a common approach in Britain, for instance with 
the use of Dispersal Orders3 to move on those thought likely to be anti-social (Crawford and 
Lister, 2007). As already mentioned, street drinking city workers are more acceptable than a 
street drinking homeless person, with the homeless person regarded as ‘unsightly’ and 
moved on. Furthermore, the homeless person’s contribution to the local economy is not on 
the scale of the city workers’ – and if you are not making a significant contribution to the 
economy your presence is more likely to be criminalized (Coleman, 2004; Millie, 2011). Such 
aesthetic – and economic – assessments can be seen as part of revanchist processes of 
revitalization and gentrification (Smith, 1996). Alongside aesthetic and economic value 
judgments are moral and prudential/quality-of-life assessments (Millie, 2011). For instance, 
for the homeless person, is it morally right to be living on the street? Or perhaps, are the 
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viewers’ morals challenged and quality-of-life affected by the sight of such visible poverty 
leading to calls to ‘get them away from here’? (cf. Berman, 1982). All four value judgments 
inter-relate in determining what or who are acceptable or deemed to be anti-social and 
banished. An influential American perspective that incorporates these value judgments is 
Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) ‘broken windows.’ Their view has had a major influence on 
British anti-social behaviour policy and it is to this that I now turn.  
 
The aesthetics of breaking windows 
A lot has been claimed about ‘broken windows,’ both for and against; as Kelling (2000: 12) 
later observed, ‘it has caused considerable consternation in much sociological, legal and 
criminological literature.’ Kelling was right in that the ‘broken windows’ perspective has 
been critiqued at length (e.g. Walker, 1984; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Harcourt, 
2001; Mitchell, 2001), as has the zero tolerance policing that it inspired in New York and 
Britain from the 1990s onwards (e.g. Bowling, 1999; Smith, 2001). It is not my job here to 
repeat all has been said before. What ‘broken windows’ provides is a simplified story 
causally linking disorder (or anti-social behaviour) to crime. The broken window is read as a 
signal of neglect, leading ‘good’ citizens to withdraw from the streets resulting in less 
informal control, more broken windows and for crime to take root. It is the job of the police 
and other agents of social control to get in early before such decline can take root. Despite 
the prominence of ‘broken windows,’ Wilson and Kelling were not the first to express such a 
view, although they were perhaps the first to link it to policing strategies. In the American 
states of California and New York, Philip Zimbardo (1973) had already run an experiment 
with abandoned cars to see how long it would be before they were vandalized and stripped 
for parts. In Britain, Colin Ward (1973) had also considered relationships between the 
environment and vandalism, according to whom: 
 
An atmosphere of dereliction and neglect evokes misuse and careless, if not wilful, destruction, by 
some users, while good maintenance and surfaces of good quality, are respected and sometimes 
cherished. The environment, in other words, transmits signals to which users respond. Following this 
theory, one architect who was conscious of the usual drab, cold, litter-strewn appearance of staircase 
landings in blocks of flats, persuaded his client that it was useful to carpet the landing and provide a 
radiator. Over the radiator he installed a shelf, and was later gratified to see that a tenant had put a 
bowl of flowers on the shelf. The signal read CIVILIZED (Ward, 1973: 14). 
 
In this regard, aesthetic signals are read as either signs of civilization or de-civilization or 
somewhere in-between – of something that is celebrated, merely tolerated or censured as 
being anti-social or criminal. A carpeted hallway is usually going to be seen as more 
attractive than one strewn with litter and graffiti. However, as noted, our assessments of 
aesthetic worth are both subjective and emotive, thus some forms of graffiti may in fact be 
welcomed in particular circumstances – although perhaps not the litter.  
According to Ferrell (2006: 261-2), ‘“broken windows” is essentially an aesthetic 
analysis of crime’s etiology.’ In effect, our interpretations of aesthetic signals lead to 
assessments of what is criminal, anti-social, tolerable or celebrated. It is an attractively 
simple idea, yet problematic for those people read as broken windows – the street 
homeless person, the graffiti writer, the hoodie wearing youth – who are then banished 
from public view. As Wilson and Kelling suggest, ‘Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant 
who has harmed no identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do 
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anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire community’ 
(1982: 35). For Wilson and Kelling the homeless person is a signal of decline that makes 
other crime more likely. For Don Mitchell (2001), the logic is incredible, that homeless 
people should be punished, not for any crimes they have done, but ‘because of the potential 
in a particular place for other people’s crimes to occur’ (2001: 68). Mitchell further notes: 
 
[T]his defence of punitive measures against homeless people simply asserts that the aesthetics of 
place outweigh other considerations, such as the right of homeless people to find a means to live, to 
sleep, to be (Mitchell, 2001: 68, emphasis in original). 
 
The study of semiotics is useful in trying to interpret such aesthetic signals (e.g. Barthes, 
1972; Eco, 1979) and the idea of signal crimes and signals of control was later elaborated by 
Martin Innes and colleagues (e.g. Innes and Fielding, 2002). Roland Barthes (1972), for 
example, followed a semiotic-structuralist approach where signs mean the same to all 
readers. An alternative perspective – adopted in this chapter – takes an interpretivist view 
‘where individuals are creative agents that make their own meanings’ (Millie, 2012: 1094). 
Wilson and Kelling clearly adopted a structuralist approach assuming that we all make the 
same aesthetic judgments. As mentioned, there can be quite different interpretations of 
graffiti writing or street art, which can be censured in one situation, yet celebrated as part 
of urban life elsewhere. The act of breaking a window itself can have different 
interpretations. A year before Wilson and Kelling published ‘broken windows,’ the Irish rock 
band U2 released their second album that included the track ‘I threw a brick through a 
window’ (U2, 1981). For Bono, the writer of the lyric, the broken window was not read as a 
signal of neighbourhood disorder or decline and something to be feared; rather, breaking a 
window was expressive and a metaphor for youthful frustration; as he declared elsewhere 
in the song:  
 
I was walking, I was walking into walls 
And back again 
I just keep walking 
I walk up to a window to see myself 
And my reflection, when I thought about it 
My direction, going nowhere, going nowhere. 
 
The broken window was important for what it signified to the one breaking the window, it 
was a positive thing. Similarly, for the street artist or graffiti writer, their uncommissioned 
images and words (cf. Young, 2014) are part of who they are, even if this is not read the 
same by all of their audience. As the British street artist Banksy once noted, perhaps with a 
hint of irony, ‘Some people become cops because they want to make the world a better 
place. Some people become vandals because they want to make the world a better looking 
place’ (Banksy, 2006: 8, emphasis in original). Urban developers and gentrifiers are attracted 
to such an ‘edgy’ aesthetic. In a critique of broken windows, Harcourt (2001: 18) declared 
that, ‘the meaning of order and disorder may not be as stable or as fixed as the order 
maintenance approach suggests.’ For Wilson and Kelling, however, broken windows were 
entirely negative aesthetic signifiers of disorder, crime and decline. 
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Conclusion 
What this chapter has attempted to demonstrate is that aesthetics have an important role 
in determining what is acceptable or anti-social and that such assessments have a 
disproportionate impact on the powerless. In line with Bourdieu (1979/2010), a hierarchy of 
tastes can be observed with more ‘legitimate’ tastes being reserved for those with power. 
The powerful may be shopping mall owners who exclude hoodie wearing youths for fear of 
upsetting the ‘consuming majority’ (cf. Bannister, Fyfe and Kearns, 2006). They may be 
gallery owners, collectors, celebrities or media outlets that tell us that certain street artists 
are worthy of attention, while others are guilty of vandalism. They may be police officers, 
urban planners or town centre managers who permit certain types of street drinking, yet 
are less tolerant of other street drinkers. As Korsmeyer (2005: 275) has noted, ‘Those who 
conceive of themselves as having good taste may condescend to those with “inferior” 
tastes.’ Utilising anti-social behaviour legislation, those with ‘inferior taste’ are deemed to 
be ‘broken windows’ to be dispersed or ‘banished’ (cf. Beckett and Herbert, 2010).  
According to Scruton (2009: 134), ‘Implicit in our sense of beauty is the thought of 
community – of the agreement in judgements that makes social life possible and 
worthwhile.’ The example given is of planning law, yet would also apply to anti-social 
behaviour law. It is a majoritarian perspective where the views or tastes of the majority in 
society take precedence. Thus, having a garden full of mermaids and gnomes is a minority 
taste – and may be regarded as anti-social. However, I return here to a question I started 
with: is it right to censure taste, something that is both subjective and emotive? 
Furthermore, should one person’s taste take precedence over another’s, even if theirs is a 
minority perspective? There will always be some whose taste is so harmful or offensive that 
censure is the right response. For instance, it is sensible to have laws that censure graffiti 
that is racist/sexist/homophobic or displays other clearly insulting or inflammatory text, 
what – in the language of anti-social behaviour – would be true ‘harassment, alarm or 
distress.’ Or perhaps law that limits who/when certain aesthetic tastes are permitted – such 
as having age limits on having a tattoo (e.g. BBC News, 2014). However, there is a lot below 
this level that is open for discussion as being simply ‘different.’ 
Perhaps, instead of seeking agreement in aesthetic taste, we should seek respect for 
difference. In British policy on anti-social behaviour the word ‘respect’ comes with the 
baggage of New Labour’s ‘Respect agenda’ (Millie, 2009b); yet it is an idea that can still have 
resonance. Rather than trying to enforce respect (as New Labour did through its anti-social 
behaviour legislation), the emphasis ought to be on promoting mutual understanding. 
According to Carla Bagnoli (2007: 117), ‘respect requires that we do not impose our views 
on others, but it also requires that we engage in a frank dialogue with them [...] the 
conclusion of this dialogue may be informed disagreement.’ If decisions concerning what is 
anti-social – and therefore censured – are informed by aesthetic taste, the idea of always 
imposing taste on others is not very attractive, especially if those deemed to have inferior 
tastes are those who already lack power. Instead, promoting the idea of ‘informed 
disagreement’ and at least some tolerance of difference (Bannister and Kearns, 2009) makes 
a lot of sense. Of course this does not diminish the serious impact in terms of harm or 
offence that some people’s anti-social behaviour can have on others. However, it does leave 
hope for the promotion of empathy, or at least recognising the other’s point of view. For 
Richard Sennett (1970: 108), this is the mature view of city living, to ‘grow to need the 
unknown, to feel incomplete without a certain anarchy in their lives, to learn […] to love the 
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‘otherness’ around them.’ However, as New Labour has demonstrated – and the Coalition 
has reinforced through the 2014 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act – enforcing 
standards of behaviour continues to take precedence. However, as this chapter has 
attempted to demonstrate, it can be a mistake to simply enforce subjective taste and banish 
the unsightly. 
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1 Chav – thought to derive from the Romany for a small child, or from the Kent town of Chatham meaning 
‘Chatham girl’ or ‘Chatham average,’ or even as ‘Council House and Violent’ (see Hayward and Yar, 2006). 
2 Ned – a Scottish term thought to derive from ‘non-educated delinquent’ (Brown, 2008). 
3 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 s.30-6 
